Self-assessment, dated and sourced.
Sovereignty self-assessment
We mapped Eldrim's actual configuration against the European Commission's Cloud Sovereignty Framework (Implementation Guidance, 1 June 2026). This is our own assessment, not a certified score, and we say where the evidence runs out.
Why there is no single score here
The framework defines eight weighted objectives (SOV-1 through SOV-8) and a five-level Sovereignty Effectiveness Assurance Level (SEAL) per objective. The Commission's Implementation Guidance states the published weights, but the guidance we reviewed does not include a complete assessment calculator with the full answer ladder and point values. Without it, a precise weighted percentage cannot be calculated honestly, so we are not publishing one. What follows is a qualitative SEAL estimate per objective, built from our own code, configuration and vendor terms, with the evidence for each claim stated.
By objective
| Objective | Weight | Preliminary SEAL | Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
| SOV-1 Strategic | 20% | 3 (self-hosted) / 1–2 (purchased capacity) | Sole EU-resident ownership, no external capital. Purchased capacity rests on the provider's written consent to our use; the fuller partnership and continuity terms are still open. |
| SOV-2 Legal & jurisdictional | 10% | 2–3 | Gateway code enforces residency policy and fails closed (503) rather than rerouting outside it. Purchased capacity is bound automatically by its provider's standard EEA-wide data processing agreement on first use; the specific site we use today is in Stockholm, Sweden. |
| SOV-3 Data & AI | 10% | 2–3 | The reviewed configuration tags every inference provider as Swedish. The router filters candidates against the customer residency policy. Those controls depend on accurate provider configuration; they do not independently attest physical location or the complete support and metadata chain. |
| SOV-4 Operational | 15% | 2 | Eldrim operates its gateway. Identity, email, supplier support and build dependencies still require a complete continuity review. Independent operation through loss of those services has not been demonstrated here. |
| SOV-5 Supply chain | 10% | 2 | Self-owned compute in Stockholm for part of the fleet. Purchased capacity's own subprocessors are EEA-based by its published terms, which also grant us an annual audit right over its data-processing compliance. GPU driver and firmware provenance not yet documented. |
| SOV-6 Technology | 15% | 1–2 | Open, self-hostable API and gateway. Most served open-weight models originate outside the EU; one is EU-built. |
| SOV-7 Security & compliance | 15% | 1–2 | Least-privilege service accounts, secrets kept out of source control. No independent security audit or certification yet; one purchased-capacity provider states it is working toward ISO 27001. |
| SOV-8 Environmental | 5% | Not yet assessable | No energy, carbon or lifecycle data published by us or our providers yet. |
Ranges reflect genuine uncertainty, not rounding. Where we write a range, it is because the honest answer depends on a fact we have not yet verified or a commitment we have not yet made. SOV-8 has no range because we have no data to estimate from, not because the answer is zero.
Sources and limits
We used the Commission's June 2026 Implementation Guidance, our gateway configuration and routing logic, and Berget's terms and DPA. DPA section 10.1 specifies the EEA and the selected datacenter; section 11 covers audits of personal-data processing. These rights do not establish control of every infrastructure dependency. The estimates are not a formal SEAL assessment and imply no CADA assurance level.
What we can already stand behind
- The gateway's routing logic enforces a customer's residency policy and refuses the request rather than silently sending it elsewhere when no eligible EU provider is available.
- The reviewed inference configuration and provider information place the serving capacity in Stockholm. This is not a physical-location audit of every support or control-plane dependency.
- Purchasing capacity from a provider does not require a bespoke contract to get EEA data residency and an audit right over its data-processing compliance: those come from the provider's standard terms, in force from first use. Our purchased-capacity provider has separately confirmed in writing that our customer-facing use is permitted.
- Our Bahnhof GPU-capacity contract is in place. That capacity is not yet technically connected to Eldrim.
What is still open
- Purchased capacity today carries no uptime guarantee beyond service credits, and the fuller partnership terms with that provider, including a standing commitment to Swedish-only processing rather than its current single-site reality, are still being finalised. Strengthening this is a commercial negotiation, not a code change.
- We have not published, and do not yet hold, independent security certification for our own operation.
- Bahnhof GPU capacity still needs technical integration and verification of access, data flows, logging, model serving and residency policy before it can serve workloads through Eldrim.
- We have not measured or published environmental data for any part of the stack.
- Most open-weight models we serve are not themselves of EU origin, even where they run on EU infrastructure under our control.
We will update this page as each of these closes, and link the evidence each time rather than just raising the number.